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THE COMMON-LAW SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT COMPARED WITH CODIFICATION AS
A SYSTEM OF JURISPRUDENCE
BY CLARENCE G. SHENTON
That the legal consequences of human action may
be predicted with certainty is one of the highest ideals
toward which those who create schemes of jurisprudence
can strive. In so far as law is determinable only by a
judgment of a court which forever concludes the rights
of the litigants, justice is not effectuated. Law which
cannot be ascertained cannot be obeyed. In such cases
we must either refuse to adjust rights, or impose the
ex post facto adjudication from which we instinctively
shrink. The case law system lends itself peculiarly to
this fault. Its substantive structure, beaten into form
in myriad controversies as the "clash of underlying interests works itself out,"' has called forth deserved
encomiums.
But what countless disappointments and
chagrined surprises the process has caused to those who
have paid and sacrificed to the end that others, not
themselves, might profit by an ascertainment of. the
' The figure is Bentley's.

"The Process of Government," p.

38
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law! The cruel process of fashioning our case law has
not ceased. Probably it can never cease, and it is not
desirable that it should. Fixity in law, and humanity's
progress are warring elements, and the concomitant of
that law which needs no hardy pioneers to blaze new
trails will be a civilization decadent, sterile, and retrospective.
First suspicion, then conviction, break in upon
students of tihe common law, that we are not utilizing to
the full the Wealth of experience which we have acquired
through so much toil and sacrifice. Profound scholars,
philosophers, statesmen, have voiced their belief that
mankind is capable of contriving a scheme which will
more nearly conform to the ideal of certainty than the
system under which we struggle today. James Bryce
enumerates the characteristic defects of the case law as
two, its frequent uncertainty, and "second, there is the
utterly unsystematic character from which the Case Law
necessarily suffers. It is the capital defect * * * one
might say the only defect of the law of England."'
Bentham styled it a "yoke about our necks, in wordless,
boundless, and shapeless shape."'* "Its grand defect is
its inaccessibility,"' writes Professor James Parsons.
"Pretty tough,"' "intricate," ' "cumbrous, ill arranged,
obscure, and not infrequently in conflict with itself,"'
"a sort of hand to mouth scrambling at best,"' "the
principal asset of the bar,"' are typical epithets. Bench,
bar, and lay must realize that opinions of opposite ten"Studies in THistory and Jurisprudence," pp. 705-706.
'Beantham's Works, vol. 4, p.451.
'Legal Topics, p. 89.
'Pollock, "The Genius of the Common Law," p. 93.
'Austin, "Lectures on Jurisprudence," vol. 2, p. 1136.
Markby, "Eleanents of Law," p. 61 et seq.
'Pollock, "Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics," p. 238.
* Durran, "The Lawyer," p. 108.
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or are not common, and where found, must be unconvincing.
Prominent among the causes of our perplexities is
the bewildering maelstrom of legal doctrine which must
be battled with as each new case arises. The unwieldy
bulk of the case law was a matter of solicitude a century
ago. "The evils resulting from indigestible heaps of
laws and authorities," writes Chancellor Rent in 1823,
"are great and manifest. They destroy the certainty
of the law, and promote litigation, delay, and subtility. '
He thought the situation "grievous." It is appalling
now. In his day one might have been conversant with
all the cases in his own state, together with the leading
cases from other jurisdictions. Today he would be a
giant indeed who could honestly make the same boast.
So much of the law of Pennsylvania as is written is to
be found in more than 445,000 pages of reports, and in
8,500 pages of digested statutes. '
"L. R. A.," begun
in 1888, with the aim of "putting the greatest amount
of matter most needed by the profession at large in the
most practicable compass," to date has spread itself
over 135,000 pages.': The effects of the increase in
bulk of the case law are cumulative. Elaborate systems of annotation and -cross reference are devised.
The necessity for explaining and reconciling prior cases
swells the reports by thousands of pages. Digests.
textbooks, and encyclopedias appear. A well known
publishing company sells the profession a sixty thousand
page encyclopedia, citing 2,800,000 cases, the last volume being completed in 1912. Two huge volumes of
annotations, citing 933,753 new cases, are added, and
in 1916 half a dozen volumes of a still more compreI Comm. 475.
Author', count.

Dickinson Law Review

40

hensive exposition have passed through the presses, in
an attempt to solve the problem by a "complete, correlated, systematic, accurate, and adequate statement of the
whole law as embodied in all the decisions." '
How long
can it be complete and adequate? The situation is indeed a "vast slough of despond in which lawyers and
judges wade in despair." " Picture the scene a century
hence!
Jeremy Bentham conceived that there might be enacted in statute form a corpus juris which "would speak
a language familiar to everybody." "A code framed
upon these principles would not require schools for its
explanation; would not require casuists to unravel its
subtleties." " Judges were to make no new laws. Commentaries, if written, were not to be cited. Lawyers
and laymen alike were to be absolved from research into the case and statute law of the past. The code was
not to be a mere compilation, or consolidation, or revision, of statute law, leaving in concurrent operation the
common law. Nor yet was it to be a digest of case and
statute law lacking legislative fiat to give it sanction.
It was to be complete and self-sufficing, a "body of law
including a complete 'succedaneum' to the unwritten
law," and Bentham was convinced that he could compile it. "
"Reductions to systematic form of the whole of the
law, whether statute law, or common law, relative to a
given subject,"
are in operation today in practically
all of the civilized world except the United States and
Cyc and Corpus Juri
"The

are referred to.

figure is Raymond Arnotus, 43 Am. Law Rev. 67.

"Bentham's Works, vol. 3, p. 209.
See his letter to Madixon, Works, vol. 4, p. 451.
* The definition is Sir Courtenay Ilbert's, "The Mechanics of
Law MakIng," p. 150.
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the British Dominions, and in these countries codifications of particular subjects are found, while in some localities there are complete systems of codes. "T They
do not measure up to Bentham's ideal, in that they do
not attempt to preclude the necessity for judicial interpretation and application. We learn that a well recognized principle of German jurisprudence" is reasoning by analogy when cases arise which are not directly
covered by the provisions of the code. "And where the
application of the principle of analogy offers no assistonce, in such cases it is for the science of jurisprudence
to examine into the 'nature' of the problem, and the 'system of things' of which it is a part, and then to seek to
formulate a resulting principle." " The French code
"has not stopped or made unnecessary historical inquiries into the French law as it stood before 1804. It has
not checked the production or prevented the citation of
commentaries." ' The Spanish code, in effect in practically all of Latin America, provides that "when there
is no law exactly applicable to the point in controversy,
the custom of the place shall be applied, and in default
thereof, the general principles of law." 22 The Swiss
code is interesting: "The code applies to all legal questions for which it contains

a provision * * *

.

If no

command can be taken from the statute, then the judge
shall pronounce in accordance with customary law, according to the rule which he as a legislator would
, Bryce, '"Studies in History and Jurisprudence," pp. 83-84.
Japan has codified since this classification.
18 The word has here the continental denotation.
"Loewy "The Civil Code of the German Empire," p. lii, Introduction.
Ilbert, "The Mechanics of Law Making," p. 178. See also
Austin, 9Lectures on Jurisprudence," vol. 2, pp. 121-127.
' Sec. 6, Introduction. Translation from Walton's "Civil
Law in Spain and Spanish America."
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adopt."" The reports of Louisiana, the exemplar of
codification in the Union, and of other code jurisdictions, abound in citations of cases from other states,'
scrutinized in the endeavor to fill the inevitable gaps.
Probably Bentham and his disciples have overestimated their powers. It is obvious that a self-sufficing code
must be framed with such minuteness of circumstance
as to provide for every conceivable contingency which
has arisen or can arise in the future. To argue the impossibility of creating such a code is to be banal. Until the world arrives at the end of its experience, cases
of novel impression are inevitable, and their nature it
is not within the ingenuity of man to foresee. Ex post
facto determination of rights to some extent is unavoidable under any system. Not only is it unavoidable, but prospective legislation is likely to be futile
Where a realization of the practical aspects involved has
not been acquired through the conflicts in the courts.
Legislation alone does not create law. Our statute
books are full of enactments which, failing to take into
consideration the practical exigencies of the governed,
the courts with the connivance of the people have allowed to lapse into desuetude. "A code can usefully
settle disputed points, and fill up small lacunae in the
law," says Judge Chalmers of England, "but it should
always have its feet on the ground. It must be form-

" Art. 1, Introduction. Translation by R. P. Shick.
" For examples see: Harringto~is Estate, 147 CaL

124, 81

Pac. 546; Peterson v. Gibbs, 147 Cal. 1, 81 Pac. 121; Coonan v.
Loewenthal, 147 Cal. 218, 81 Pac. 527; Fuller v. Lumber Co.,
'114 La. 266, 28 So. 164; Le'wis v. Ry. Co., 114 La. 161, 38 So.
92; Ri cardson v. Ins. Co., 114 La. 794, 38 So. 563; Garmany V.
Lawton, 124 Ga. 876, 53 S. E. 699.
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ed on the firm basis of experience, otherwise you are
codifying in the air.""
Whether codification would to some extent dissipate
the uncertainty and disorder of our case law has been
the subject of zealous debate. The traditional attitude
of the common-law practitioner is antagonistic. It is
argued that law, and particulary common law, is not
codifiable. Statutes, it is said, are the most prolific
sources of litigation. " Words ate at best a poor vehicle for the expression of thought. The iteration of
doctrine found in the decision of a judge is an infinitely
more satisfactory exposition of the law than the categorical declaration of a statute, under which the interpretation of law tends to become a matter of mere grammatical construction. The unwritten constitution of
England is better understood, and is subject to less dispute, than our codified state and national constitutions.
Consider the incompetency of the average legislature.
And yet we have all the machinery .at our disposal for
enacting ordinary legislation that we could have for enacting a code. Where codes have been adopted, legislatures have indulged in persistent, wholesale, and unnecessary amendment, which not only mars the substance of the law, but destroys the very certainty which
the codes are designed to procure. " It is contended
that constant reference to cases from other jurisdictions
promotes assimilation of doctrine and uniformity ot
law, whereas, as witness our divorce laws, statutes produce the wildest diversity. If the case law is obscure
"Codification of Mercantile Law," 25 Am. Bar Assoc. Rep.
282.
" Carter, "Law, Its Origin, Growth and Function," p. 284.
" See "The Progress of Law Reform in New York," Arnot,
43 Am. Law Rev. 67; "A Century' of Judge Made Law," Hornblower, 7 Col. Law Rev. 453; Coudert, 'Certainty and Justice,"
1P. 19.
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and contradictory, it is no more the peculiar function of
codification than of ordinary legislation to utter correctives, and of the two processes codification is immeasurably the more difficult. The common law has shown
wonderful capacities for meeting the needs of civilization as they materialize. A code must surely have the
undesirable effect of militating against its free growth.
The cogency of most of these arguments persuades
us not to expect too much from codification. Their
relevancy depends upon the definition of codification at
which they are aimed. We cannot expect that codification will be more effective in creating substantive law
than any other legislation, and we have come to accept
it as approximately true that "to make the law certain
on subjects as to which the community itself is most
uncertain is a task which never has yet, and never will be
accomplished," ' whether the attempt be by legislative
enactment or by judicial decision. But if we seek to
enact only the results obtained and sanctioned by long
usage, we surely can be met with no objection save that
of the inadequacy of words to meet our demands. We
are loath to believe that such is the nature of our law.
Anything so amorphous, yet so intimately touching our
lives, inspires a dread. The phenomenon, much witnessed of late, of cyclopedias and text books cited by bench
and bar as authorities-as summarizing correctly the
case law-indicates that the inadequacy of language is
not an insuperable obstacle to codification.
The most potent arguments against codification
find us no remedy for that "capital defect" of case law,
its unsystematic character. The benefits to be derived
from order and system in jurisprudence are not to be
denied. Bentham had this thought when he remarked,
"'He who has been least successful in the composition
Coudert, "Certainty and Justice," p. 22.

Dickinson Law Review

45

of a code has conferred immense benefit. '
At present
he who writes a good textbook does great service by
classifying the case law. But textbooks and encyclopedias usually ignore the statute law, and their business
I's
to enlarge upon conflicts, to provide the attorney with
weapons for either side of mooted questions, not to settle
them. Courts remain hopelessly at variance and obscure
whei e time can produce no new evidenea, where the
,community opinion is well defined, where the unmoral
aature of the question leaves no excuse for lack of unanimity. Legislatures alone can sanction choice in such
cases. Digests are inadequate. Their cases have no
extra-forum authority. If cases from but a single forum are digested, lacunae will inevitably exist which
could safely be filled by the tested experience of other
jurisdictions. Legislative sane tion is needed to fill up
the lacunae . None but an authoritative exposition can
delete and ignore the elements to which other expositions owe much of their massiveness. Judge Dillon
thought codification on this basis the "manifest destiny" of the United States and England."
Codification's strongest argument is that it is a
huge and worldwide .fact, and that it has invaded so
many strongholds of the common law. In France and
Germany it has been called a "popular success."" "In
,France leading provisions of the code have become
household words. Familiarity with them is presupposed in popular literature and on the stage.'"' "To the advanced and scientific student of law, the code civil (of
France) has supplied a framework to be filled in, supple-

-

See Ilbert, "Legislative Methods and Forms," p. 126.
"Laws and Jurisprudence of England and America,"

873.

Ilbert, "The Mechanics of Law Making," p. 154.
Ibid. pp. 174-175.

p.
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mented, and illustrated. And to the ordinary student
of law it is an inestimable boon that he should be able
4,o find within reasonable
compass an orderly and
authoritative statement of the leading rules of his
craft."' "Besides the merits due to its general spirit,
the Code possesses certain technical qualities, due to excellent draftsmanship. These qualities are unity, system, precision, and clearness."'
"With regard to the
form, the (German) Code may well be proclaimed a
model of scientific draftsmanship," and it "may be
truly said to have become a popular handbook."" That
codification would have the salutary effect of renderIng more certain those parts of our law in which our
experience justifies our finding certainty might reasonably be expected.
The impulse toward uniformity imparted by case
law is negligible. On the other hand history reveals an
avidity on the part of states and nations to imitate
codes considered well wrought.
The Code Napoleon
"gave the signal for an enormous movement toward
codification ............ which extended over the whole world,
............ acting diree .tly even upon the precise mode of
codification,"' and carrying with it the substantive
civil law. At least five states have adopted the rejected Field codes of New York." Probably we have most
t(, expect from codification in the cause of uniformity,
for it is in answer to uniformity's demands that codification seems to come peculiarly to its own. Codification
Ibid. p. 180.
Jean Brissaud, in 'General Survey by European Authors,"
p. 290.
Prof. Ernst Freund, Ibid. p. 449.
Brissaud, "General Survey, etc.," p. 305. Louisiana res-ponded to the movement, p. 304.
California, Montana, Iowa, Ohio, South Dakota. See 42
An. Law Rev. 910. Carter, "Law, Its Origin, etc.," p. 307.
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In the German Empire was but an expression of the
struggle for national unity.' By codes France sought
relief from vexatious diversity.' Of the territories of
the British Empire, India was worst harassed by conflicting systems, and India alone of the British Empire
has codes of any pretensions.u In our own country the
Uniform Commercial Acts are among the most successful codifications.
The objection that codes cramp and stereotype the
law, retarding its natural and free growth, brings to
light a curious group of anomalies and contradictions.
It fails, in the first place, to take that philosophic view
pf the common law which a short study of its history
should inspire. When the strictum jus of the common
law failed to provide a suitable vehicle for substantial
jiustice, substantial justice emerged through the medium
of courts of equity, or by the intervention of fictions.
Absolutism, feudalism, and the stupidity and stubbornness of the courts themselves, have failed to check the
progress of the common law, and it is reasonable to
suppose that codes would succeed no better. Secondly,
paradoxically enough, the doctrine of stare decisis has
been invented to impart that very fixity at the con'templa tion of which the opponents of codification hold
up their hands in dismay. Lastly, stare decisis, whose
sole raison d'etre is to impart stability and certainty,
is one of the prime causes of the unwieldy bulk of our
!case law, and therefore one of the prime causes of its

"General Survey," p. 435 et seq. Ilert, "The Mechanics of

Law Wlakimg," p. 164. Bryce, "Studies in .History and Jurisprudence," p. 777.
"The Laws of England," p.
U Halsbury's Ifitroduction to
cxxi. Ilbert, "Mechanics of Law Making," p. 1-56.
" The Government of India," Ilbert, p. 403.
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uncertainty. Jus tice Black of Pennsylvania writes,
"If each new .set of judges sha~l consider themselves at
liberty to overthrow the doctrines of their predecessors,
our system of jurisprudence would be the most fickle,
-uncertain, and vicious, that the world ever saw ............
To avoid this great calamity, I know of no recourse but
that of stare decisis.'"' Expressions like this are to
be met within the reports every day. Can one wonder
tt the assiduity with which lawyers search for cases
in point when courts profess such deference for prece4ents? They are apparently as essential to the lawyer as statutes. Here, undoubtedly, is one of the most
fruitful causes of the embarrassing multiplication of reported cases and legal doctrine. It is worth while to inquire whether stare deoisis can survive subjection to the
light-of reason.
"It is a fundamental proposition," says a New
York justice, "that a decision on; a matter of law, if once
formally rendered in a court of last resort -Where the
commn law is binding, is thereafter final and irrevocable
by the court itself, and it can be changed only by the
act of the legislature."" That may be considered a fair
statement of the doctrine. If followed, it might achieve
its purpose and justify its existence. It is usually not
stated, and never applied so severely, however. "It is an
established rule to abide by former precedents," says
Blackstone.' But he immediately emasculates the rule
by adding, "Yet this rule admits of exception where the
former determination is most evidently contrary to reason."
Chancellor Kent writes, "If a decision has been
Hole v. Rittenhouse, 2 Phila. (Pa.) 411.

In re Tod, 147 N. Y. Supp. 165.
"I Comm. 69.
1 Comm. 69.
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made upon solemn argument and mature deliberation.
the presumption .is
in favor of its correctness, and the
community have a right to regard it as a just declaration of the law, and regulate their actions and contracts
by it."" But he also leaves a breach through which
Lord Brougham's coach and six may readily pass, when
he qualifies, "The judges are bound to follow that decision unless it can be shown that the law was misunderstood or misapplied in that particular case."" A New
York court speaks as follows: "The court almost always
in deciding any question, creates a moral power above
itself; and when the decision construes a statute, it is legally bound for certain purposes to follow it as a decree
emanating from paramount authority."" "I am not saying that we must consecrate the blunders of those who
went before us," says the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in a decision which, strange to say, uphdlds stare decisis.
"A palpable mistake must be corrected ............
There are
old decisions of which the authority is become obsolete
by a total alteration in the circumstances of the country
and the progress of opinion. Tempora mutantur.''
If under the influence of these typical expositions
our stare decisis be not vanished into thin air, it must
be admitted that its boundaries are so vague and
shadowy as to be incapable of definition. What court
which detects an error in a precedent will admit that the
precedent is not "clearly erroneous ?" Yet in that event
we have ample authority for overruling precedents."
"It is by the notoriety and stability of such rules that
"1 Comm. 475-476.

" Ibid.
" Bates v. Relyea, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 336. The italics are
CUTS.
',McDowell v. Oyer, 21 Pa. St. 423.
"See authorities cited on page 19, note 1.
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professional men can give advice to those who consult
them, and people in general can venture to buy, and
trust, and to deal with each other."' Of course, if
people are not charged with notice of decisions, the doctrine collapses. If they are charged with notice, *why
should they not be permitted to rely absolutely upon the
decision? Why should they be compelled to speculate
v hether or not a subsequent court will determine that
the precedent upon which they would like to rely in "flatly absurd and unjust,'"' and overrule it?
If knowledge
of decisions on the part of the people is hypothecated,
why not hypothecate knowledge of their being overruled?
Non sequitur that rights which have accrued in reliance
u)pon the precedent cannot be protected if the precedent
is repuddated. The mere doubting of the correctness of
the precedent -should be notice that it will be safe no
longer to rely upon it, even though equity requires that
it be followed in the particular case. The exceptions
sanctioned by the sponsors and advocates of the rule
have consumed it. As a means of promoting stability
and certainty stare decisis is a wretched failure.
Stare decisis is as fallacious in theory as it is futile
in its purpose.'It presupposes an. immutable common law,
incapable of adapting itself to the changing needs of
society. It proceeds upon the hypothesis that there is a
law, which it is the function of a court to declare. Once
declared, the law is not to be changed by the courts.
Why not? Shouldn't laws be changed at times? Granted,
say the courts and commentators, but the power to
change is not delegated to the courts. "To iYelax this
principle and incorporate the power to change at will,"
said a New York judge in the year 1914, "would be to
convert courts of justice into new legislative organs.
" 1 Kent's Comm. 476.
.Blackstone uses the phrase in this connection.
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For the power to change the law is in America

*

and England the exclusive attribute of the legislature
proper.'"" In these days, when judicial legislation is a
by-word, note the disavowal of power and inclination to
change the law or usurp legislative functions. A precedent
is
to
be
followed,
according
to
Blackstone,
because, "what
was
before
uncertain
and
perhaps
indifferent
is
become
absolute rule, which it is not in the breast of any sub.
sequent judge to alter or vary from, he being * * * not
delegated to pronounce new law, but to maintan the old
one." " In other words, a decision is not to be changed

because it
is law, and it
is law because
it is not to be changed by the judges.
Courts are not to change laws, for that would prove
that
courts
can
change
laws,
and
there
would be left no reason to foster the minion of the
courts, stare decisis.
By what charter do the courts
measure their powers, that they are so finicky about
thanging law? That courts do not change or create
law, but merely declare and apply it, is middle age
casuistry which no longer falls upon credent ears. '
Stare decisis requires us to assume the unbelievable,
that all precedents have been correctly decided for all
time, or else to conclude that, in its futile attempts to
promote stability, its sole justification is to perpetuate
error. What need to follow more than the reasoning of
a precedent, if it has been decided on principles of'
eternal justice? The scale of justice is to be kept even
and steady, says Blackstone, and "not liable to waver
In re Tod, 147 N. Y. Supp. 165.
I1Comm. 69.
"Favorite fiction," says Dillon, "Laws and Jurisprudence
of England and America," p. 267. "Childish fiction," Holland,
Jurisprudence," p. 66.
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with every new judge's opinions.""
But suppose the
opinions of the new judges are the better? "The reasons which are sufficient to influence a court to a particular conclusion in one case ought to be sufficient to
bring it or any other court to the same conclusion in all
other like cases," argues Cooley."
True, they ought to
be. But are they? We must postulate the infallibility
of counsel and court which establish the precedent, or
be resigned to the consecration of a blunder.
That stare decisis is not in theory an indispensable
element in jurisprudence is indicated by the repudiation
of the idea in those jurisdictions which administer
codified civil law. "Judges are not allowed to decide
cases submitted to them by way of general and settled
decisions," reads the French code." The German code
enacts that "in future decisions no regard is to be had
for the opinions of teachers of the law." " There is a
conscious attempt to prevent the addition of anything
to the body of the law by the indirect process of judicial
legislation. Decisions are to have "no higher rank,
theoretically at least, than the expositions and comentaries of private writers.""
They are to be binding
neither upon the courts which render them, nor upon
inferior courts, and are to be merely persuasive, advisory, and evidential. "
There is nothing inherent in the substantive civil
law, or in codification, which should lead to this atti" 1 Comm. 69.
Const. Lina. p. 83.

"Art. 5, Code Civil Francais.
Sec. 6, Introduction. Translation by Loewy.
Dillon, "Laws and Jurisprudence of England and Ameri(a," p. 173.
" Holland, "Jurisprudenca," p. 69. Gray, "The Nature and
Sources of Law," p. 195.
'
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tude. Codification and stare decisis are not mutually
exclusive conceptions. Judicial decisions must be made
under codes. They might well be obligatory, and in fact
are, in theory, in the United States where codified law
obtains. " The codes of Germany and France-and
from these two have emanated all the modern civil law
codes-found their origin and model in the code, so calledi " of Justinian. it is natural that precedents should
receive no great deference under a system which adopts
a ready made substantive law. " So likewise it is natural that a people who have beaten out their substantive
law through judicial decision, while their legislative organs were in the quiescent stage, should acquire a race
habit of reverence for precedent. But the notion of
stare decisis is not foreign to civil law countries in the
earlier development of their jurisprudence, and its re1,udiation is a growth which might be expected to have
supplanted judge-made law to some extent when legislatures of common law countries emerged from their
quiescence. Prior to the time when Justinian forbade
the citation of extra-code authority, the Romans were
familiar with the theory of stare decisis, and their
edicts, rescripts, "responsa prudentum," etc., probably
had some binding force as precedents. " In the early
history of Genian jurisprudence the doctrine of judicial
precedent prevailed, "but the modern German civilians
have rather ungratefully kicked down the ladder by
which they themselves climbed, and exhibited a great reCarter, "Law, Its Origin, etc." p. 304.
" "So
called," the epithet is appropriate in view of our
-dfinition of "code." See ;Carter, "Law, Its Origin, etc.," p. 266
et seq. Also 7 Col. Law Rev. 453.
Bryce, "Studies in History and Jurisprudence," p. 777.
See Gray, "The Nature and Source of Law," Secs. 424-433.
Mackeldey, '"Ronan Law," sec. 34 et seq. But see Markby, "Eleirnts of law," p. 61,
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pugnance to recognizing judicial decisions, or Gerichtsgebrauch, in any form as a source of law.""
Such is the theory of precedent in the civil law
jurisdictions. "In practice, however (in Germany), the
influence of judicial decisions could not be denied. * * *
Decisions have great weight, and are practically regarded as precedents when they represent the consistent
practice of the courts." '
In France are found "veritable streams of judicial law, which can neither be re•sisted or turned aside."" French advocates search for
cases in their favor, and "the more they find, the more
sure they are of winning.""
A great Spanish writer
criticises the code of his country for ignoring "an essential factor in the history of the civil law (and of all
other legal systems), the vital and creative force of the
decisions of the courts.""
The civil law, which has spurned stare decisis in
theory, finds in practice its judicial decisions adding to
the substantive law. The common law, deferring to the
doctrine in theory, disdains it in practice. In both cases
the results might have been expected, for both systems
are unconsciously following a third and more important
fundamental principle. The attempts of the civil law
to prevent precedents from adding to the body of the
law are futile because they fail to take into consideration the fact that judicial usage is not the only usage
'by which law may be created, just as the common lawx,,
"Gray, "The Nature and Sources of Law," secs. 436-455,
collecting German authorities.
' Loewy, "The Civil Code of the German Empire," Introduction, p. lii.
es Brissaud, "General Survey, etc." p. 300.
" Brissaud "General Survey, etc.," p. 300.
"Rafael Altamira, Ibid. p. 698. See Salmond "Jurisprudence," p. 1-9, 4th ed.
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failed to realize that its rules would have developed
without the aid of stare decisis, as in fact they have.
That.a precedent is not binding upon courts is not to
say that law may not be the indirect result
of the precedent. Decisions are likely to -conform
to precedent for other reasons than that courts
are
obliged
to
follow
them. The
precedent
may be based
upon
compelling
reason
and
justice. Its doctrine cannot'be dislodged. It may
be difficult to dislodge the doctrine even of an unjust
decision before a court of like political or other proclivities, or of identical personnel to that which uttered the
precedent. Acquiescence and conformity, perhaps unwilling, are likely to follow. Acquiescence may be ready
and prompt in cases where the moral or ethical bearing
is not patent, or is negligible. Judge made adjective law,
and those decisions, conformity with which has created
"rules of property," fall within this class. Decisions
tend to establish usage.
Out of customs of life and
business grow standards by which rights and justice are
measured. "The feeling that a rule is morally right is
frequently due to the fact that it has long been followEd as a rule.""
Yet this is not stare decisis. When precedents
work such injustice that people cannot or Will not acquiesce, no rule deters the civil law from reconsideration, and happily, the common law in its practical results is almost in complete consonance. After all,
precedents in the common law serve no purpose but to

The words are Prof. Gray's. 9 Harvard Law Review, 27,
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inform the conscience of the court." Dedisions from
ether jurisdictions were never supposed to do more.
No attorney stops with the citation of a single case if
others are to be found.
Precedents frequently, no
doubt, form convenient refuge from the embarrassment,
iot to speak of the exertion, of deciding on their merits,
cases which would reach the same results through de
novo consideration. But "cessante ratione legis, cessat
ipsa lex," is a much used maxim, and though we perpetrate a petitio principii by proof that stare decisis is not
followed in practice, by citation of instances where it
has been disregarded, the fickle doctrine can scarcely
object to being applied to itself. Authorities in copious
quantities may be found to the effect that a single decision is not necessarily binding; that decisions will not
be adhered to if there is something manifestly erroneous
therein, or for other reasons; that if a decision has not
been acquiesced in it is the duty of the court to pass
upon it again. " Our common law has evolved largely
in spite of the restraints of stare decisis.
We apprehend that the civil law theory of precedent is the more reasonable. Any attempt to force upon
a civilized people with democratic tendencies law which
fails to take a reasonable view of the relations of life at
the time the law is promulgated is bound to prove
abortive. Absolute certainty is unattainable, for justice
and right will never be more than relative conceptions.
Stare decisis can never be more than a temporary drag
upon the law. A law which shifts is no better for lagTo this effect see Holland, "Jurisprudence," p. 70. Morris,
"History amd Developmr nt of Law," p. 303. Abbott, "Justice and
"

the Modern Law," p,232. Pollock, ':Essays in Jurisprudence and
Ethics," footnote, p. 245.
See 11 Cyc 745 et seq; 26 An. & Eng.

Encyc.

of

Law,

166-167; 7 R.C. L. 1007 et seq; case note, 12 L.RABS. 1081.
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ging a century behind civilization. Even though stare
decisis fails to produce serious petrifaction of the law,
vho can say that it has not set us in pursuit of false
gods? That the emphasis in our jurisprudence has not
been
misplaced?
That the struggle for the
truth
has
not
yielded
to
the
dry
hunt
for
cases
in
point?
That
stare
decisis
is not responsible in large measure for the "riotous
pandemonium of cases," a phenomenon which, it seems,
has not seriously annoyed the civilians? "
To summarize and conclude. Some uncertainty is
inherent in any system of jurisprudence. But there
inheres in case law an uncertainty which arises from
disorder. Codification on the firm basis of an exceedingly rich experience should, cure this defect. Let
hidges continue their inevitable work of deciding controversies and legislating if need be, on the frontier
lands of the law. But jettison stare decisis. Let not
even an impotent theory work for the suppression of
constant inquiry into what is best and most just. Perhaps then it will be less inequitable to deny the plea of
ignorance of the law, and conscience will function with
more satisfactory results.
Dillon, "Laws and Jurisprudence of England and America"
p. 285.
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MOOT COURT
ZIEGLER v. SPANGLER
Contract for Sale of Land-Vendee in Possession-Right to Recover for Improvements in Ejectment
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Ziegler contracted with Spangler to convey a farm for
*65,000. Spangler was put in possession and !made improvemients costing $2,500, adding at least $2,00& to the market value
of the premises. Spangler retained possession for two years
but nxade no payments cin the purchase money although it was
payable in three months after taking possession.
Ziegler -has begun ejectment. Court has allowed jury to
find for plaintiff unless within 3 months -the $5,000 shall be paid.
The result of Spangler's failure to pay will 'be the loss of the
land and*improvements thereon.
Katz for plalintiff.
McNichols for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Dorio, J. The questions to be considered in this case
are, first, can Spangler be ejected for non-payment of purchase
Tnoney? Second, if he can, can he recover for the value of improvements he put upon the premises?
Spangler agreed to go into posessicln and pay the purchase
noney in three months. He remained in possession two yeaza
and did not pay it. He clearly is guilty of breach of contract.
The law is well settled that where a person goes into possession
under a contract of purchase, with consent of the vndor and
then defaults in payment of purchase money, he may be ousted
by the vendor in an action of ejectment. The first question
is therefore answered in -the affirmative.
Counsel for defdndant contends that Spangler 'being a bona
fide purchaser should aecover for the improvements. If such
were the case undoubtedly he could, but this is not true in the
case at bar. iBoth patties entered into a perfectly valid contract, supported by the consideration of $5,000 to be paid in
three months 'by Spangler. Not having performed his part of the
contract he cannot recover for improvements made upon the
prenises during his possession. The instruction of the lower
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court to the jury was correct. Unless Spangler pays the purchase money within three months, he shall be ejected from the
land and lose the improvements.
Affirmed for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The vendor of land, who has Inot conveyed thd title, when
the vendee has taken possession, may enforce payment of the
lurchase money, by the action of ejctment. The court will
provide a time within which if payment of the money is not
made, the wxit of babere facias possessionem may issue,
and on the sheriff's delivery of the possession to the vendor, all
rights of the vendee in the land will be ended. Improvements
made by him are inseparable from the land, and become the
property of the vendor. In the case before us, the vendor recovers the land plus $2,000 worth of improvements. This is a harsh
result but can be averted only by remedial legislation.
The harshness of the strict foreclosure of a mortgage has
been overcome by obliging the mortgagee to sell the land, and
leave to the mortgagor any surplus of the purchsae money after paying the debt and interest. A similar method in the case
of the contract of sale, under which a portion of the purchase
money has been paid, or improvements have 'been made, would
not be inappropriate, and it would be reasonable to confine the
vendor to it.
The judgment of the learned court below must be affirmed.

KINGDON v. R. R. CO.
Evidence-Negligence-Scintilla-Facts

Left to Jury

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Xingdon was struck by a locomotive while crossing a track.
'The liability of the defendant depended upon its having or not
having blown a whistle and rung the bell. A person living in the
neighborhood said, "he did not hear either and could have heard
it." The engineer testified that both signals were given. The
court allowed the jury to say what the facts were. Verdict for
,plaintiff. Motion for judgment, n. o. v.
Rubin for plaintiff.
Mervine for defendant.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
RAUB, J. The evidence in this case was evidence of
fact and as such was properly submitted to the jury. The evi
dence having been submitted the verdict of the jury must stand
unless it can be shovn that the evidence was not such evidence
as should have been given to the jury for their consideration.
For in Confer v. Pennsylvania Railroad -Co., 209 Pa., 425, Justice
Potter said, "The fact was specifically submitted to the jury and
having 'been found in favor of the plaintiff, it was error for the
trial judge to ednter judgment for the defendant on the ground
that the evidence itself was insufficient to sustain the finding.'
Also, in Commonwealth v. McDowell, 86 Pa. 377, court held, "The
judge cannot himself draw conclusions of fact from the evidence." But in Holland v. Kindregan, 155 Pa. 156, it was held,
"It does Inot follow that because the evidence on one side may
be overwhelming in the opinion of the trial judge, that the case
can be withdrawn from the jury. If there is a conflict of evidence it must go to the jury unless the evidence on olne side
amounts but to a scintilla. Where the evidence is so weak that
it would be the duty of the court to set aside the verdict of the
jury, there is no propriety in submitting it." In Fisher v. Scharadin, 186 Pa. 565, the inquiry was whether there was any evidence beyond a scintilla in substaintation of plaintiff's claim. The
court held that, "if there was no evidence capable of submission
to the jury the claim must fall, not for insufficiency but for want
of evidence."
In the present case the question of whether the verdict of
the jury can be set aside, and judgment n. o. v. granted depends on whether there was, or was not evidence beyond a
scintilla in support of the plaintiff's claim.
We will now consider the evidence. Witness for the plaintiff was a person who resided in the neighborhood. In reference to the fact whethez or not the bell of the engine had been
rung and the whistle blown said, "i did not hear either and could
have heard it." Against this was the positive testimony that
both were given. In our opinion the testimony of the plaintiff's
witness was not such as should have gone to the jury. In Keiser
v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., 212 Pa. 209, nine witnesses testified
that they did not hear the bell ring nor hear the whistle blow.
The testimony of these parties was held to be negative in character aInd could not prevail against the positive and conclusive
testimony of the appellee which clearly showed these duties to
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have been performed. Also, in Anspach v. Philadelphia and
Reading Railroad Co., 225 Pa. 528, witnesses for plaintiff as to
the ringing of the bell and blowing of the whistle merely said,
"they did not hear either." In this case the court said "negative testimony of this character by those who did not hear, as
against positive affirmative testimony of persons who did hear,
and -who were in a position to know is not enough to make out
a charge of negligence. The trial judge would have been justibed in taking the case from the jury for want of sufficient evidence to justify a verdict against the defendant."
In light of these cases, we are persuaded to think as contended by defendant. The mere fact that the plaintiff lived
near the railroad does not make his testimony so important,
that because he could have heard it and did not in this particular
instance, that his testimony should be given any weight by the
jury. It was at most negative testimolny. And in Newhard v.
Penna. R. R. Co., 153 Pa. 417, the judge of the court below, in
entering judgment on the reserved -oint, thought the evidence of
negligence sustained by negative testimony was "meager," the
upper court thought there was none. The judgment n. o. v.
entered by the lower court was sustained by the upper court.
'Also, in Knox v. Railway Co., 202 Pa. 504, it was held that the
testimony of a passenger that the usual warnings were not given at the crossing against the engineer, fireman, brakemain and
conductor was not sufficient to warrant a submission of the case
to the jury.
Had this witness for the plaintiff in the present case stated
that he was listening for this warning and told why he was
listening then his testimony would have been of a higher grade
and amounted to more than a mere scintilla. In Culhane v. N.
Y. C. R. R., 60 N. Y. 165, the following rule is stated: "A mere,
'I did not hear,' is entitled to no weight iun the presence of affirmative evidence that the signal was given, and does not create a
conflict of evidence justifying a submjission of the question to the
jury as ene of fact." The Pennsylvania rule, Uinfortunately,
has never been stated as 'broadly as that, but it has been freouently said that where negative testimony arnbunted to only a
scintilla, a jury cannot be allowed to disregard the positive and
conclusive testimclny which establishes the controverted fact.
We all know that -we do not take notice of the things which
are of daily occurrence, such-as the warnings given by railroad
trains at crossings. Undoubtedly, this man who lived so near
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the railroad, bad become so accustomed to hearing the warnings sounded by the engines, that it is unbelievable that he
should take any particular notice of the absence of these warnings at this one specific instance, and his"testimony should have
*been disregarded.
Ioreover the testimony of the engineer is that he gave the
-warnings. From our own experience, we know that if a person
has a special act to do at a certain time and place, within a
short time, he becomes so accustomed to doing that special thing
at that certain time and place that he does it almost unconsciously. And a person, who has a position of trust and upon
whom rests a great responsibility and a duty to perform, is presumed to have performed this duty until it has been affirmatively
rebutted. Surely, in the light of the foregoing, the testimony
of the plaintiff's witness, which we have shown was but negativ
was a mere scintilla. And this mere negative testimony should
not, under all circumstances considered, have been given any
weight at all nor submitted to the jury. For the reasons stated
in the above opinion, we grant the motion of the defendant for
judgment n. o. v.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
Judgment affirmed.
HITCHENS v. FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY.
Fire Insurance-Cancellation of Policy--Substitution of
Company for Another

One

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Hitchens obtained a fire insurance policy for $2,500 from
four insurance companies on certain personal property. The
defendant's policy gave it the right to cancel it on 5 days' notice.
Notice was given on August 13, 1917, but on August 16 a fire
totally destroyed the property, the value of which was $25,000.
On August 14, 19,17, Hitchens obtained a policy for $2,500 from
a fifth company, intending this to take the place of defendant's,
but this intention was not communicated to defendants nor was
any distinct intention formed that defendant should be relieved
before the expiration of the five days: i. e. of the 18th of August.
Ilitchens has been paid $2,500 on each of four policies other than
defendant's. He claims $2,500 from the defendant.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
Fischman, J. The question in this case is whether the
plaintiff can recover, on a cancelled policy, for damages to his
property before the expiration of the required notice, having already recovered once from another company for damages to the
same property.
The case of Arnfeld v. Guardian Assurance Co., 172 Pa.
C305, is directly on point in favor of the defendant. The jury in
that case was charged as follows: "If the jury believe from the
evidence that the plaintiff's, by their agent, Charles Zugschmidt,
on the 10th of May, 1893, took out a policy in the Queen Insurance Company for $2,500, upon the same property as that covered by the policy in suit, and that their purpose in so doing
Nias rnot to increase their line of insurance, but to substitute
the policy in the Queen for the policy in suit, then, in view of
the fact that the defendants had given notice on the 8th of May,
1893, to cancel the policy within five days agreed upon, the policy
in suit would be cancelled the moment the risk was assumed in
the Queen ,Comlniany and the defendants sliould be released."
In the case before us, the evidence is clear and undisputed.
(n August 14, Hitchens obtained a policy for $2,500 from the
Bifth company on the same property intending that policy to
take the place of the cancelled one. The plaintiff ought to have
surrendered for cancellation, the defendant's policy immediately
after that same risk was assumed by the fifth company. What
ought to have been done, equity will consider as having been
done. The fifth company assumed the risk of insuring the
plaintiff's property and they compensated the plaintiff for the
damages which he suffered. Why, then should he also be entitled to recover from the defedndant for the same injuries to the
same property? It certainly is not equitable to allow a person
to recover twice for the same debt.
In view of the above facts, we must decide in favor of the
defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPRE3ME COURT
The learned court below has decded in favor of the defendant in deferdnce to Arnfeld v. Guardian Assurance Co., 172 Pa.
005. There was there an agreement between the assured and the
company that the new policy should be a substitute for the
fcrmer; that the company should be released. This element is
wanting in the present case. Hitchens, notified that one of his
policies would lapse, took out another, intending it to take the
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place of the other. But, when? Before the other ceased to
lrotect him, or only when it ceased? The intention of Hitchens was not that defendant should be relieved before the expiration of the five days; nor was it his intention that the new policy
should be a substitute, after the lapse of the five days, for the
existing olne, communicated to the defendant. The property
totally destroyed was worth $25,000. The enforcement of all the
policies will give hinX only one-half this sum. The case of
Scheel v. German American Insurance Co., 228 Pa. 44, rather
than that relied on by the learned court below, furnishes the
correct rule of decision.
Judgment reversed with venire facias de novo.
RICKETTS v. JOSIAS
Promissory Notes-Action Against Endorser-Pxotest-Certificate
of Notary-Proof of Notide--Negotiable Instrument
Act of May 16, 1901, P. L. 194
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Josias endorsed a note for $500 to Ricketts which the
maker failed tio pay. Josias denies that notice of dishonor
was given to him. A notary's certificate states, that notice
was sent by mail duly addressed and stamped. The defendant
denies that he received such notice. The notary, called as a
-witness says he has no recollection. The court tells the jury,
(1) the actual receipt of notice is not necessary to bind the defendant; (2) but noA-receipt could justify (but not require)
the inference that notice was not duly sent; (3) that the assertion in the certificate is sufficient to establish the fact of gending the notice, unless it is overcome 'by the non-receipt by the
defendant and by the failure of the notary to remember that
the notice was sent.
Verdict for the defendant. Motion for a new trial.
Sacks for plaintiff.
Jeffers for defendant.
ESKOVITZ, J. Section 105, Negotiable Instruments Act
of May 16, 190.1, P. L. 208, reads as follows: "Where notice of
dishonor is duly addressed and deposited in the postoffice, the
sender is deemed to have given due notice, notwithsanding any
miscarriage in the mails." The fact of depositing in the postoffice a properly addressed prepaid letter enclosing notice of
a protest of a promissory note, raises the presumption that it
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reaches its destination by due course of mail.' This presurnp.
tion may be rebutted. Phoenix Brew. Co. v. Weiss, 23 Super,
An affidavit of defense denying receipt of nobice is insuffi.
cient, without stating such facts as would justify the inference
that no notice had been given or due diligenbe used; and evidence that no notice was received is inadmissable in the absence of an allegation or an offer to prove that notice was not
duly sent or that there was negligence in giving notice. This
view is upheld in all modern cases. ,MeConeghy v. Kirk, 68
Pa. 200.
The defendant oontends that the first instruction, that, the actual receipt of notice is not necessary to bind the defendant, is
entirely to broad. In support of this he claims that See. 105 of
Neg. Inst. Act, as quoted supra, has no application here. Let
us see if this is true. First, he claims that there is no evidence
of the notice having been sent, while there is evidence of its
non-receipt. To this we do not agree. It seems that the very
converse of this is true.
The certificate of the notary, introduced in evidence states
the fact that notice was sent by mail duly addressed and stamped. This if carried out as stated, fully complies with Sec. 105
of the Neg. Inst. Act, treating of the manner of giving notice.
The Act of 'December 14, 1654, which is quoted below, admits
this certificate in evidence.
Act of December 14, 1854, P. L. (1855) 724 states, "The
official acts, protests and attestations of all notaries, certified
according to law, under their respective hands and seals of oflice, in respect to the dishonor of all bills and promissory notes,
and of notice to the drawers, acceptors or indorsers thereof,
may, be received and read in evidence as proof of the facts
therein stated, In all suits now pending, or hereafter to be
brought: Provided, that any party may be permitted to contradict by other evidence any such certificate." This act makes
the certificate of a notary prima facie evidence of the allegations set forth in it and if there is nothing in contradiction
it is conclusive evidence of what it contains. Scott v. Brown,
240 Pa. 328.
From the foregoing it follows there can be no controversy
.s to the sufficiency or completeness of the notice. The whole
issue as we see it, is whether a certificate is conclusive evidence
in the absence of an effective rebuttal? To relieve the defendant, it must be proved that he received no notice of protest,
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.but a)so, that no notice was given or due diligence used to appraise him of the default of the maker. Tradesmans Bank v.
Tillyer, 12 Pa. C. C. Rep. 452; McGee v. Northumberland Bank,
5 Watts 82; altarshall v. Sonneman, 216 Pa. 65.
Marshall v. Scdnne.an supra, is unlike our case. There
notice of dishonor was addressed to the wrong party and it
stated that the holder looked to such person for the payment
of the note.
The facts in First National Bank v. Tustin, 245 Pa. 151,
are sinrilar to the facts in the case at bar. There the defendant attempted only to establish by negative allegations that he
did not receive notice. That was held insufficient. If the defendant had offered to -prove some direct fact which would have
tended to show that the essential requirements of the Act of
A sser.bly had not been performed, either in the irotesting of
the note or the giving of notice, the controverted facts might
have been left to the jury. 'But the condition which confronted
the court as in this case, was nothing but the bare proposition
to prove that defendant did not receive notice. There was no
fact offered, which tended to show that the notice was not duly
received at defendant's place of business or residence or the
place where his mail is usually delivered, or that it had been
deposited in a United States mail box, or that the notary had
neglected to do anything which the law requires him to do,
which resulted in the defendant not receiving notice. If
the
offers had conveyed any of these elements they would probably
have been admitted. Instruction number one affirmed.
Instruction number two, that non-receipt could justify, (but
not require) the inference that notice was not duly sent, we think is
correct. In our opinion, however, it does not help the case of
the defendant.
'either do we think the First National Bank v.
.cBride, 230 Pa. 26.1, favors him any.
In that case the affidavit distinctly denies personal service of notice, orally or otherwise. If it stopped here, its insufficiency would be apparent for the reason that perscinal service is not required. But it also denies notice by the mails, in
fact any notice at all until suit. The notary's certificate merely stated: "whereof I duly notified the indorser." It does not
say how it was sent. But the court said, "had the statement
averred that the notice had been given in some particular way
allowed by law, nothing, but a.specific denial of the fact alleged
would have been sufficient to prevent judgment." This is our

67

Dickinson Law Review
case.

Hlere the certificate is complete and no

specific

denial

was given.

Before passing upon instruction number three, that the
assertion in the certificate is sufficient to establish the fact of
sending the notice unless it is overcome by the non-receipt by
the defendant and by the failure of the notary to remember
that the notice was sent, we shall review several authorities.
We think that mere non-receipt being admissible evidence
has been disposed of in the negative in the foregoing discussion.
So we shall only consider the second alternative of that instruction, namely, the necessity of the notary to renember the
sending of notice.
In Herer v. Easton Bank, 33 Pa. 134, it was held that the
fact that the notary could not remember the sending of notice
was in'material. The certificate was positive proof, the want of
recollection no proof at all. Scott v. Brown, 240 Pa. 328, is
closely akin to our case. Here it was held that the certificate
of the notary that he had given notice to the defendant raised
the presumption, eince his act was an official act, that is was
properly performed and his certifleate standing alone entitled
the plaintiff to go to the jury.
We think it is reversible error in an action on a note for
the trial judge to submit to the jury as a fact or circumstance
in the case the testimony of the notary to the effect that
he had no present recollection of the indorser having been sent
or given notice of the dishonor of the note.
The indorser may attack the correctness of the certificate
by a denial of receipt of notice. But the notary's inability to
remember anything should be given no weight in support of
(efendant's denial, if the notary does not deny the genuiness
of the certificate. If the certificate contains a copy of the note
and declares payment had been demanded and refased of which
due notice was given to the indorser, the certificate meets the reovirements of the statute. Zollner v. 'Moffitt, 222 Pa. 644;
First National Bank v. Delone, 254 Pa. 409. Therefore the last
instruction of the lower court can not be affirmed.
Motion for a new trial granted.
OPINION OF THE SUPREMIE COURT
With most of the doctrines laid down by the learned court
below, in its carefully and ably written opinion, we agree.
(1) The actual receipt o! notice of dishonor of a bill or note,
by the endorser is not necessary. The Act of 1901 authorizes
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the use of the postoffice for conveying the notice, and exempts
the endorsee from the risk of non-delivery if the notice is addressed to the proper party and at the proper place.
(2) It is very rarely that a properly addressed letter fails
to reach the addressee. From the postoffice non-delivery of
rotice, then may be ir.ferred, with some degree of confidence,
that the letter if properly addressed was not posted. This inference could be made, even if therewas no evidence of posting.
But in this case, the rotary's certificate is evidence of posting.
It is not conclusive, however. The learned court below thinks
that the non-receipt of the letter would justify the inference
that it was not duly sent; that is, that non-receipt might be
treated by the jury as overcoming the force of the notary's certificate. In this we think it correct.
But if the mere non-receipt would justify the jury's
()
inference that, despite the notary's certificate, the notice was
not sent or not properly addressed, or stamped, how does it
happen that this fact (non-receipt) accompanied 'by another
fact (the notary's failure to remember) loses its potency?
That the notary has no remembrance is explainable many other
ways, 'by the hypothesis that he did not in fact send the notice.
It points in the- same direction as the fact of non-receipt. If
the second position of the court at trial was correct, .how can
the third be erroneous? We fail to see.
In First National Bank v. Tustin, 146 Pa. 151, the denial
was that protest of a note had been made. But protest is unnecessary, and, though there was no protest, notice of dishonor
might have -been given, and there was no denial that such notice
had been given. The case is not similar to the present.
As the misconception may have affected the verdict and
Judgment of the court, we are obliged to reverse.
Reversed with venire facias de novo.

